The SADC is a sub-regional international organisation comprised of 15 transitional States that have embraced the principle of the rule of law as a basic norm of their constitutional arrangements. Their biggest challenge presently is to undo the provocative and salient legacy of social, economic and psychological apartheid on their territories for almost a century, without disrupting their developmental endeavours. This article examines the question of what role if any the SADC Tribunal envisaged under Article 9 of the constitutive SADC Treaty might play to facilitate successful transitions from apartheid to egalitarian rule. It shows that a multiplicity of dialectics abound that do not allow for easy answers, much to the frustration of both the cultural relativists and their rivals, the universalists, regarding human rights protection. The article recommends meaningful pedagogical engagement of the challenges confronting the SADC subregion as a direct consequence of almost a century of apartheid -the worst form of governance known to man in recent times. This should inform national, sub-regional and regional dynamics in the pursuit of SADC goals and aspirations.
Introduction

By a Declaration and
The SADC Treaty lists among its primary objectives the acceleration of economic growth of the region and the improvement of living conditions of its citizens through regional cooperation in different fields, and the harmonisation of economic development of the region. 8 In Article 4, the organisation lists among its cardinal principles human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 9 and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
10
The requirement of the rule of law is indisputable anywhere you look. When challenged, even the worst totalitarian governments refer to legal standards of some system in their own defenceusually Article 2(1) and often enough Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. The former states that: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members." Classical approaches to international law that interpreted this provision as declaring an unfettered discretion regarding State conduct within the confines of their own territories have since been discredited. 11 The latter is said to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of all States from external interference. 12 Almost always, totalitarian States attempt to clothe even their worst acts with an appearance of legality.
The rule of law has been described as a "political value" that is characterised by the requirement to restrict an entity's exercise of power through the separation and counterbalancing of the competencies of its institutions. The purpose is to ensure that judicial power is separated from other 5 See Article 45 of the amended SADC Treaty, 2001 . 6 See SADC website: <www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/120> (accessed 12 May 2012). 7 English, French and Portuguese. 8 Article 5. 9 Article 4(c). 10 Article 4(e). 11 Several UN institutions established after World War II contradict this view. In particular The UN Commission on Human Security and the recent inauguration and immediate application of the responsibility to protect principle in Libya support the view that under modern international law, sovereignty does not trump human rights. 12 United Nations Charter (UNC), 26 June 1945, San Francisco, UKTS 67 (1946) Cmd. 7015, 1 UNTS xvi.
powers of the entity, and the other powers are subjected to oversight of the judiciary. 13 Where this paradigm thrives, liberty also thrives. According to Tamanaha, 14 liberty is the right to do whatever the law permits. The law establishes the scope of secure action within which individuals may then conduct their affairs as they please. Members of a community have liberty only to the extent that all are restrained by the law from doing harm to one another. In this sense liberty is possible only under the rule of law which is the only security from tyranny. Critical to the rule of law is a functional independent judiciary.
The idea is not so much to ensure judicial rectitude and public confidence, as to prevent the executive and its many agents from imposing their powers, interests and persecutive inclinations upon the judiciary. The magistrate can then be perceived as the citizen's most necessary, and also most likely, protector. The judiciary is the point of most direct confrontation between the government, law and the individual, and it can therefore serve as the best barrier against lawless governmental actions.
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By seeking to ensure that legislative and executive functions are not united in the same body of persons, and that the judiciary retains and maintains continuing oversight over the other institutions of power, power becomes a check on power. Without such a check on power apprehensions will persist that the same monarch or senate may enact tyrannical laws and execute them in a tyrannical manner. 16 Thus, the principle of the separation of powers is the foremost test of any claims to governing in accordance with the principle of the rule of law. Any tinkering on the edges or at the core of it diminishes any claim to governing by or living under the rule of law.
The majority of SADC States are signatories to a wide range of regional and international instruments that espouse the rule of law as a fundamental of both States Parties' national and subregional constitutional arrangements. State practice shows that geographical circumstances, or intimate historical ties, or present concerns of fundamental importance often make for more successful treaty regimes than those engaged in for the pursuit of mere ephemeral or theoretical and several other admonitions. 20 This supports the view that African States in particular are evolving constitutional regional customary international law norms on various issues, including the inviolable sanctity of constitutional processes for change of governments. ECOWAS, which appears to be playing the lead-role in the Mali case, is the equivalent of the SADC in that they are both sub-regional organisations of the African region.
The SADC had itself taken similar action against Madagascar by its Double Troika Summit
Communique of 14 January 2010 21 which had reiterated and maintained the suspension of
Madagascar from all SADC organs, structures and institutions until the restoration of constitutional order in that country, and called upon the AU, UN and other international organisations and institutions to also apply the same measure. The Summit had rejected "any attempt to use democratic means, institutions and processes to legitimise Governments that came to power through unconstitutional means, and urged the international community, in particular the development Article 4 lists as one of the key principles governing the organisation, the duty of Member States Parties to act in accordance with "human rights, democracy and the rule of law".
Moreover, the constitutive treaty of the organisation includes individuals' human rights guarantees against the State. Article 6 provides that: "SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, disability, or such other ground as may be determined by the Summit". This leads to no other conclusion than that the SADC has embraced the rule of law as one of its basic norms. A government that governs truly in the best interest of the people … should have no fears of an independent judiciary. The judiciary and the executive branch of government should be partners in the good ordering of society. For a government to oust the jurisdiction of the courts on a broad scale reflects a lack of confidence in the justifiability of its own actions, and a lack of confidence in the courts to act in accordance with the public interest and the rule of law. The Treaty makes provision for the establishment of a tribunal. The Protocol is the document that then sets up the tribunal and provides for the powers of the Tribunal. I have examined the protocol very carefully and I have not observed therein any reference to the courts of any of the countries within SADC. If indeed the intention was to create a tribunal which would be superior to the courts in the subscribing countries that intent is not manifest in the document presented to me. The supreme law in this jurisdiction is our Constitution and it has not made provision for these courts to be subject to the (SADC) Tribunal. This court is a court of superior jurisdiction and has an inherent jurisdiction over all people and all matters in the country, and its jurisdiction can only be ousted by a statutory provision to that effect. I do not have placed before me any statute to that effect and the protocol certainly does not do that. It is institutionally inappropriate for a Court to determine precisely what the achievement of any particular social and economic right entails and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the institutions of government best placed to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of democratic accountability that they should do so for it is their programmes and promises that are subjected to democratic popular choice.
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The long and short of it is that it is not the function of courts to either draft governmental policy or to determine its content, 58 which is what the SADC Tribunal appears to have sought to achieve in
Campbell.
59 Thus, the mere presence of competing legal claims may not be sufficient to qualify a dispute as justiciable. Justiciable disputes are those disputes that lend themselves to an acceptance by the disputants of a judicial finding.
In ex parte Dyer (1994) Simon Brown L.J. stated that: "Matters of national policy are not open to challenge before the Courts other than on the basis of bad faith, improper motive or manifest 54 Section 27(1) provides that: "Everyone has the right to have access to: (a) health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance". By paragraph 2 the State is obliged to "take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of the rights listed in paragraph 1 (a-c)". 55 absurdity. Matters of national economic policy are for political -not judicial judgment". 60 This is because the doctrine of separation of powers applies to exclude from judicial scrutiny matters of public policy. Judicial attempt to control such policy decisions is rare and when it occurs it is always regarded as an intrusion into the proper decision making competence of the executive -GCHQ case. The findings against the application of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17, which authorises the government to seize land for redistribution to dispossessed peasants, begs the question whether the SADC Constitution is both comprehensive, compact and static; or whether like other constitutions, it is an organic and evolving body of norms that both responds to, and maintains and shapes, peace and security under the rule of law principle. In this connection, the primary test for the SADC's present constitutional arrangements is whether they are fitting and resilient enough to ensure the least painful path away from apartheid's debilitating social, economic and psychological legacy of inequality based along racial lines, to egalitarian rule. It has been argued that apartheid had resulted in semi-authentic beings that could not pursue self-actualisation whether they were the beneficiaries of the system or victims of its brutality. 62 Even Nobel Laureate F.W. De Klerk, President of South Africa (1989-1994), maintains to this day that apartheid was not then, and is not now, a repugnant idea. The one white leader that probably did the most to end apartheid in South Africa claims that it was for other reasons, and nothing to do with the immorality of the idea. It had become unworkable! "There are three reasons it (apartheid) failed. It failed because the whites wanted to keep too much land for themselves. It failed because we (whites and blacks) became economically integrated, and it failed because the majority of blacks said that is not how we want our rights." 63 His justifications for a system that the UN has criminalised through its most elite category of norms -jus cogens -highlights the extent of the challenge facing anyone tasked with undoing the legacy of apartheid.
More importantly, the framers of the 1992 constitutive treaty of the SADC could not have imagined, or foreseen, all the scenarios that would require the Tribunal's determination. Therefore, the principles enunciated in that document will require supplementing and adjustment in order to ensure efficiency of the system intended. For this reason, the Tribunal must fill in the gaps as they arise. Resort to regional customary international law in the same way that domestic courts resort to common law principles when statute falls short is a sure way forward. Failing that, the Tribunal ought to declare appropriately a state of non-liquet or decline jurisdiction on account of the policy nature of disputes similar to the land issue.
Regional Customary International Law (CIL) and the Interpretation of the SADC Treaty
To establish a system that sufficiently and efficiently addresses transitional States of the SADC's challenges relating to the legacy of apartheid, the SADC Tribunal must, in addition to distinguishing between justiciable judicial disputes and non-justiciable policy matters, 64 take into consideration applicable norms of regional customary international law. This approach has the benefit of protecting the judiciary from needless confrontation with relevant policy goals of the 
Inter-Human Rights Discourses
Whether and their institutions confirms a unity of purpose in time. It also presumes certain qualities about the experiences of the communities they serve. However, as the analysis below shows, such presumptions can be dangerously misplaced, even misleading, and therefore to be made with great care.
On Human Rights Discourse Transplants
Otto laws were the result of apartheid -a system of governance that international law had also found to be so repugnant to human nature that it criminalised it in the end 87 by way of jus cogens, the most elite category of norms of international law.
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Another question that the initial question triggered for the SADC was that of judicial thoroughness.
Although the Tribunal had noted in the well-publicised case of Campbell 89 that Zimbabwe's land issues have a long history, it had limited its considerations to "current applicable history" without regard whatsoever to the "underlying past history" of colonial confiscation and enslavement of natives. This is a matter of public record. Nonetheless, SADC Sates' inauguration of black economic empowerment as a regional norm of customary international law 94 shows three things which the SADC Tribunal appeared to miss. The first is majority rule governments' own conviction in their own competence to address land issues even with norms of similar quality to those that apartheid governments had previously relied upon to confiscate and alienate native Africans' land. In this sense the SADC Tribunal's reasoning is vulnerable from charges of false appearances of constitutionalism because majority rule governments have as much sovereign competence as their predecessor apartheid governments to legislate on any subject on their territories subject only to the requirements of general international law. SADC constitutional laws include also basic SADC customary international laws.
The second is majority rule governments' deliberate creation of a lex specialis that targets the economic and social legacy of apartheid rule. Lex specialis is Latin for "law governing a specific subject matter". It derives from the maxim "lex specialis derogat legi generali" or a "special rule prevails over a general rule". 95 The doctrine applies to the interpretation of laws regardless of jurisdiction. It requires priority to be given to a law governing a specific subject matter (in this case land disputes) over a law that only governs general matters (such as Article 6 of the SADC Treaty), particularly where the competing standards are of equal stature. Shaw writes that lex specialis derogates from general law or lex generalis "so that the more detailed and specific rule will have priority". 96 It matters not that the lex specialis is customary international law while the general norm is a treaty provision. Shaw writes that regarding the question of priority as between custom and treaty is resolved by the general rule, "that which is later in time will have priority".
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Moreover, where the lex specialis appears in double versions, both as treaty and custom, there should be no presumption that the latter is subsumed by the former. The two may co-exist. 98 Therefore, it is extremely curious that the land jurisprudence of the SADC Tribunal consistently privileged the lex generalis provisions of Article 6(2) 99 of the sub-regional SADC Treaty adopted in 1992 over the sub-regional customary international law norm crystallised by the simultaneous and compulsive promulgation in the last two decades of national statutes and regulations and the setting of whole governmental departments, and standing progress evaluation conferences, and scorecard 103 observed that this is the only way of ensuring legitimacy for those whose task it is to interpret constitutional texts such as the SADC Treaty. This is because texts often continue to exist when the reality has become something quite different.
Institutions are living things. All codification is abstract. Jurists have long ceased to confine themselves to studying the mechanical operation of institutions and laws. They seek to discover in each succeeding epoch the social reality which these embody. This method is just as applicable to newly-established institutions as to those which have ceased to be anything but a matter of history. The latter approach takes due regard of two things. One is SADC States' recent inauguration of reconciliation, reconstruction and the pursuit of equality as a regional norm of customary international law. 107 The other is the mandatory requirement to consider CIL's position on the matter. Only in this way can the Tribunal ensure against legal intolerability in the Radbruch sense. 108 Legal intolerability is reached when the contradiction between positive law and justice reaches an intolerable level and the law becomes a "false law" from justice's perspective. Legalised injustice occurs "[w]here justice is not even aimed at, where equality -the core of justice -is deliberately disavowed in the enactment of a positive law, then the law is not simply 'false law ', it has no claim at all to legal status". ii) History of legal dispossession of native land during apartheid and the requirement of the principle of fairness.
iii) Social and economic reconstruction agenda of the SADC encapsulated in post 1992 regional customary international law.
Consequently, it risks fermenting violence in affected States particularly because of its own violence on majority rule constitutional land laws that it has rendered completely inapplicable to land rights disputes while upholding the effect of apartheid constitutional land laws in affected
States by shielding them from the possible effects of emergent reconstruction laws. Therefore, the Tribunal could not while developing such jurisprudence serve to facilitate reconciliation and reconstruction and to repair communities damaged by a century of apartheid policies.
To be of any use to the parties, future jurisprudence of the SADC Tribunal should: i) Account for the evolving nature of the SADC constitutional provisions, particularly those norms provided for by regional constitutional customary international law.
ii) Adopt a more flexible teleological interpretation of SADC Constitutional provisions.
iii) Be mindful of the hazards inherent in legal transplants. In particular, it should recognize that it is a transitional Court -practically a vehicle to facilitate departure from the effects of the worst form of government ever known to man to a promised better possible one, built on equality. Consequently, any borrowing from other jurisdictions should be tempered by the requirement of how similar courts (in temporal context) discharged their obligations in transitional settings similar to its own.
This should be the minimal duty of a human rights court serving societies in transition from a century of apartheid rule to equality.
Tribunal's Duty to Pursue Proportionate Reconciliation and Reconstruction Jurisprudence
Support for the view that the SADC Tribunal may be under a duty to ensure the development of a proportionate reconciliation, reconstruction and pursuit of equality jurisprudence is apparent. Courts The ILO might act in perfect conformity with all the articles of the Treaty [its constitutive Treaty -The Peace treaty of Versailles 1918, gave it power to secure as far as possible, equal conditions for all workers of the world by the adoption of uniform Draft Conventions and Recommendations]; it might obtain the ratification of every Convention; it might distribute throughout the world abundant information; and nevertheless be nothing but a bureaucratic institution without real authority. Its publications would not be read; its recommendations would be treated with indifference; its life would be purely formal.
Within the framework of the same constitution, on the other hand, it may come to be regarded by public opinion as a beneficient and necessary institution. It may command the attention of governments; its advice and intervention may be sought; its operations may furnish the workers whom it protects and the employers who are anxious to secure organisation and stability with opportunities for a continuous effort. A common spirit may be created which will animate it from within. It may be the centre of a real and intense international life. 115 The birth and sudden suspension of the SADC Tribunal shows the Tribunal's enormous failure regarding Albert Thomas' social relevance requirement. This is in large part because of the Tribunal's failure to interpret its role among its subjects, particularly in light of SADC States' adoption of reconciliation, economic and social reconstruction, and the requirement of equality as a basic norm of regional customary international law. Consequently, the Tribunal has struggled to deal with the question of the validity of apartheid-engineered property rights in the post-apartheid dispensation. In fact one wonders to what extent the SADC Tribunal manifests the psychological legacy of apartheid. It seeks to uphold and legitimise the land thefts of the apartheid era by emasculating efforts of majority rule governments to undo those thefts probably because they occurred over a century ago.
In Re-crafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Professor Dyzenhaus painstakingly examines case examples to determine whether we should continue to regard as legally valid something which had offended against fundamental principles of justice and the rule of law merely because it had been legally valid in terms of the positive law of the system of the preceding order.
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The same question applies very much to the SADC land issues of today. The question that the Tribunal's emergent property rights jurisprudence has raised is whether it is ethically sustainable for the Tribunal to privilege property rights emanating from apartheid constitutional land laws while simultaneously denying the applicability in the same sphere of similar laws of majority rule governments that are seeking to reverse confiscation of native black lands under white domination and without compensation.
Reconstruction jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany makes apparent that
Court's awareness of the utility of social relevance to its practice. By Section 2 of Decree 11 of the Reich's Citizenship Law of 25 November 1941 a Jewish person lost his citizenship and by implication any corresponding property rights if his usual residence was abroad at the time the Decree came into force, or whenever he made his usual residence abroad after the coming into force of the Decree. 115 Thomas, supra note 76, p. 263. 116 Alexy, supra note 84, p. 15.
The Federal Constitutional Court's jurisprudence disavowed Decree 11 as false law on account of its intolerability or conflict with justice. It stated that the Decree "so evidently contradict [ed] fundamental principles of justice that the judge who applied them or recognised their legal consequences would pronounce injustice instead of law". 117 The power which the Home Secretary seeks to uphold is a power to detain people indefinitely without charge or trial. Nothing could be more antithetical to the instincts and traditions of the people of the United Kingdom.
At present, the power cannot be exercised against citizens of this country. First, it applies only to foreigners whom the Home Secretary would otherwise be able to deport. But the power to deport foreigners is extremely wide. Secondly, it requires that the Home Secretary should reasonably suspect the foreigners of a variety of activities or attitudes in connection with terrorism, including supporting a group influenced from abroad whom the Home Secretary suspects of being concerned in terrorism. If the finger of suspicion has pointed and the suspect is detained, his detention must be reviewed by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. They can decide that there were no reasonable grounds for the Home Secretary's suspicion. But the suspect is not entitled to be told the grounds upon which he has been suspected. So he may not find it easy to explain that the suspicion is groundless. In any case, suspicion of being a supporter is one thing and proof of wrongdoing is another. Someone who has never committed any offence and has no intention of doing anything wrong may be reasonably suspected of being a supporter on the basis of some heated remarks overheard in a pub. The question in this case is whether the United Kingdom should be a country in which the police can come to such a person's house and take him away to be detained indefinitely without trial.
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It is to these instincts of justice that courts of law should look to when assessing the substantive quality of the questions placed before them. This is because judicial courts have a duty to ensure law's integrity by ensuring against intolerability which results when validly proclaimed laws contradict requirements of justice. In particular, affected States of the SADC have to fathom an objective and sustainable formula to efficiently eradicate apartheid's salient legacy of unequal land distribution on racial lines and the economic exclusion of the majority black communities.
Perhaps some still do believe that the implementation of Rhodesia's (now Zimbabwe) Land Apportionment Act (1930) that had reserved 30 per cent of all agricultural land for the 1.1 million blacks and 51 per cent of all agricultural land for the 50,000 whites was not contrary to the principle of fairness. And some that the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act (1951) and the Land Tenure Act (1969) that had reinforced land classification into African and European areas with the result that by 1960 more than 25,000 black families had become squatters on a "communal basis" -a condition that had been aggravated by the civil war for independence until 1980 when the first majority rule government came to power -was not contrary to fairness. And others that the refusal of commercial farmers to make land available to the Zimbabwean government through the willing seller willing buyer policy is not inconsistent with the current policy of reconciliation and reconstruction.
Moreover, under the critical date theory, international law requires that barring application of the much diminished doctrine of terra nullius which operates to authorise a State to claim sovereign rights over territory that its agents had encountered as vacant and belonging to no one else, any competing claims to ownership of territory ought to be settled between the contesting Parties by stopping time on that all important significant date to which they both point. "Whatever were the Parties' respective positions and corresponding rights then should be enforced now." 121 It has never been claimed that Zimbabwe was terra nullius at colonisation. That fact was the basis upon which blacks had premised their armed liberation struggle on against the settler white regime. Therefore, the legal titles that commercial farmers insist upon may not be valid as blacks can point to ownership of the same lands before colonisation. In fact this is a matter of historical record.
Secondly, blacks could argue that to insist upon colonial land titles in the reconciliation, reconstruction and pursuit of equality era would contradict justice in the Radbruch formulation sense. Thirdly, it could be interpreted as the farming community's rejection of reconciliation, reconstruction and the pursuit of equity, and therefore a declaration of war.
Additionally, Mabo No.2
122 turned down a long list of cases, including UK Privy Council decisions that had held that native peoples of colonised lands were "so low in the scale of social organization"
that it is idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to Western civilisation. The fiction by which the rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as nonexistent was justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law. Per Brennan J:
121 Cane and Conaghan, supra note 85, p. 1161. 122 [1992] HCA 23.
The policy appears explicitly in the judgment of the Privy Council in In re Southern Rhodesia in rejecting the argument that the native people 'were the owners of the unalienated lands long before either the Company or the Crown became concerned with them and from time immemorial ... and that the unalienated lands belonged to them still. Moreover, the Tribunal failed to justify its decision to uphold unjust laws of the colonial legal order.
It casually noted that:
The applicants are, in essence, challenging the compulsory acquisition of their agricultural lands ... under the land reform programme undertaken by the Respondent. We note that the acquisition of land in Zimbabwe has had a long history. However, for the purposes of the present case, we need to confine ourselves only to acquisitions carried out under section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 of 2005. 1) To acquiring land for resettlement only on a willing seller/willing buyer regime. Therefore the government's land reform programme would depend on the speed and extent to which commercial farmers were willing to make land available. As it turned out that strategy failed. It has also failed in South Africa.
2) From making constitutional changes that would affect property rights of individuals within the first ten years of majority rule.
Therefore, the Lancaster House Agreement required blacks to postpone any hopes of reconciliation with their land -a very frustrating thing indeed as it is land claims that had been the rallying point of the many sacrifices, including life, which many had had to make during the armed struggle for political freedom.
With the satisfaction of the sunset clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement the Zimbabwe government had begun to amend its constitution so that they could overcome the frustrations of the commercial farming community which had held back land required to expedite the resettlement of landless peasants. It is these constitutional amendments that the white farmers sought declarations against at the SADC Tribunal. This was a indirect attempt to ensure the same result with or with no sunset clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement. The Tribunal, in its own words, did not care about the history that had eventually peaked in the suit before it. But the Campbell case shows also the peaking of blacks' frustration with the denial of their legitimate expectations.
There is a real sense of misfortune when those whose actions should demonstrate objectivity and reason miss their opportunity. The suspended SADC Tribunal's emergent jurisprudence on land reform sounded like the last nail in the coffin of native Zimbabweans' hope for legal recognition of the injustices that have accompanied them in the name of the law since the arrival of the Pioneer
Column on their territory in 1890 until now. What should they do that they have not already done for their land rights to be recognised at law and for them finally to be reconciled with their confiscated lands? The emergent land rights jurisprudence of the now suspended SADC Tribunal shows that even getting rid of settler apartheid regimes is not enough for this to happen. Neither is satisfaction of sunset clauses contained in settlement agreements such as the Lancaster House Agreement, nor the enactment of reconstruction legislation by majority rule governments. Hope alone that one day commercial farmers would make land available has proven to be illusory since colonisation.
When judicial bodies such as the currently suspended SADC Tribunal extinguish hope held this long, and anarchy breaks out, it is because the law has lost its integrity. The SADC Tribunal's emergent jurisprudence on land rights frustrate Asmal's 128 hope that law is that which people should instinctively turn to these days for collective self-expression. Committees that are tasked with interpreting the major universal human rights instruments -favour teleological interpretations that give due weight to context, or to genuine requirements, in order to ensure social justice. It is not a requirement of the principle of the rule of law to trump social 128 Asmal, supra note 112, p. vii.
justice. Professor Miller has helpfully defined social justice as a people-oriented idea and a critical idea that "requires us to reform our institutions and practices in the name of greater fairness". 129 On the contrary, the rule of law should always be a handmaiden of social justice because whenever social justice is threatened, peace and security, which are the pre-requisites for court activity, could not be guaranteed. The League of Nations had realised this fact and established the International Labour Organization by Chapter XIII of the Peace Treaty of Versailles for the specific purpose of ensuring social justice so that conditions of privation and hardship could never again be visited upon such a large number of the people of the world and lead to peacelessness and insecurity. the right to property is a traditional fundamental right in democratic and liberal societies. …The role of the state is to respect and to protect this right against any form of encroachment, and to regulate the exercise of this right in order for it to be accessible to everyone, taking public interest into due consideration. 134 Only by securing the channels for social justice can peace and security be secured. [T]he principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant. For example, in a State where the general conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or impair their enjoyment of human rights, the State should take specific action to correct those conditions. Such action may involve granting for a time to the part of the population concerned certain preferential treatment in specific matters as compared with the rest of the population. However, as long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the Covenant.
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Colonial governments had passed and enforced successive pieces of draconian constitutional land laws that had left natives landless, stranded and compelled to become wage earners in order to pay hut and other taxes towards their new white rulers while the settlers themselves creamed off for themselves lands situated in zones with the most potential for agricultural activity and packaged them into large-scale commercial farms, national trust lands, etc.
With the acquiescence of other SADC Member States Parties, these three longest apartheid ruled customary international law on black economic empowerment as their basic norm for dealing with the salient legacy of apartheid rule engineered social and economic inequalities along racial lines.
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The task of substituting economic and social equality for economic and social inequality in the postapartheid dispensation is made more complex by status-quo advocates' pleas to respect for property rights and the respect for the rule of law and constitutional guarantees. It is also made difficult by the unflinching positions adopted by social justice advocates who insist upon the inviolability of apartheid rule engineered property rights in the post-apartheid dispensation.
The task of substituting equality for inequality in transitional SADC States is made even more complex by the tensions around social and economic reconstruction between post-apartheid governments and judicial courts and tribunals that are manned by men and women that appear to be so removed from the realities from which the matters placed before them for adjudication originate.
Their selective application of historical facts to the disputes would impress even the masters of fiction. Consequently, governments' reaction to the findings of these tribunals has annihilated any hope that the SADC Tribunal in particular could give judicial judgments that governments would be keen to follow through.
Conclusion
The cases filed at the SADC Tribunal challenging Zimbabwe's on-going land reform programme gave the SADC Tribunal the opportunity to objectively determine the question whether what had been legal under apartheid rule could still be insisted upon in the reconciliation and reconstruction era even though it breached the intolerability test under the Radbruch formulation. The SADC Tribunal is not the first judicial decision making body to have been confronted with this question.
However, the SADC Tribunal appears to have made a right mess of it, and through its jurisprudence on the matter dismally failed Albert Thomas' social relevance test. More importantly the SADC Tribunal failed to distinguish between matters of policy that properly belong to the province of the executive under the doctrine of separation of powers, and justiciable disputes that properly belong to the attention of the judiciary.
Even if we supposed that these disputes were within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, it is questionable whether its resort to legal transplants from incongruous Courts was a reasonable thing to do. The
Tribunal failed to recognise that as a Human rights court for peoples in transition from apartheidthe worst form of government known to man in recent times -and attempting to make a way 138 Chigara, supra note 48, pp. 213-242.
towards egalitarian rule, it should have considered if it wished only that jurisprudence coming from courts that had presided over similar issues during their own societies' transitions to egalitarian rule.
In this sense, jurisprudence developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court at several points in the recent history of Germany would have been more apposite to the task of the Court than that of the ECtHR.
Moreover, the Tribunal completely ignored the seminal jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee on the application of the prohibition against discrimination for communities in transition. In particular it missed the teaching of General Comment 18 which authorises reverse discrimination in appropriate cases, of which the dismantling of the legacy of apartheid in the SADC is one. Instead the Tribunal pursued a narrow and simplistic formulation of the prohibition against discrimination in its attempt to apply the obligations of Article 6 of the SADC Treaty against the on-going land reform programme in Zimbabwe.
Probably, the SADC Tribunal would have done better if it had taken due regard of the complete history of the land issue in the SADC, starting even with pre-colonial land rights in Zimbabwe. That would have established the validity or not of colonial constitutional land laws, if for instance the land had been terra nullius and the commercial farming community had had no prior rights to observe before establishing the farms at issue in the disputes before the Tribunal. Instead the Tribunal focused only on apartheid constitutional land laws as the only legal titles that were at issue.
The Tribunal would have enhanced its legitimacy, which it did not, had it also taken account of the organic nature of the SADC's constitutional arrangements, particularly in light of the sub-region's current transitional circumstances from apartheid to more egalitarian societies. That would probably have brought to its attention the relevance to these land disputes of the later regional constitutional customary international law norm on reconciliation and reconstruction for the purpose of undoing the economic, social and psychological legacy of apartheid -the BEE norm.
Consequently, the Tribunal could be criticised for failing to ensure law's integrity because its ruling Therefore, a re-established SADC Tribunal would do well to interpret the SADC Treaty in matters presented before it in a way that ensures its own social relevance by several ways. It should always seek to:
1) Maintain the distinction between non-justiciable public policy matters which are the preserve of the executive on the one hand, and justiciable matters that could fall for its determination in accordance with the Tribunal's rules of procedure.
2) Avoid developing a jurisprudence that is inconsistent with the requirement to disavow validly enacted laws of a perished order. transition from apartheid to democratic governance by making itself socially relevant to the newly inaugurated regional norm of customary international law on reconciliation, economic and social reconstruction, and the requirement of equity.
5) Understand the application of lex specialis in light of general law.
Only by ensuring these requirements could a reconstituted SADC Tribunal achieve integrity in its jurisprudence and also gain the social relevance which it had lost, resulting in the suspension of its mandate and role in the sub-region especially at a time when such a judicial institution was most needed. This is because SADC States have deliberately inaugurated lex specialis on post-apartheid social reconstruction. The aim is to undo apartheid rule engineered social and economic inequality on racial lines in affected States. The regional customary international law norm on reconciliation, economic and social reconstruction appears to have been promoted by South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. It has been actively supported and
